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Abstract
We study a general equilibrium model in which firms choose their capital structure
optimally, trading oﬀ the tax advantages of debt against the risk of costly default. The
costs of default are endogenous: bankrupt firms are forced to liquidate their assets,
resulting in a fire sale if there is insuﬃcient liquidity in the market. When the corporate
income tax rate is zero, the optimal capital structure is indeterminate, there are no fire
sales, and the equilibrium is Pareto eﬃcient. When the tax rate is positive, the optimal
capital structure is uniquely determined, default occurs with positive probability, firms’
assets are liquidated at fire-sale prices, and the equilibrium is constrained ineﬃcient.
More precisely, firms’ investment is too low and, although the capital structure is chosen
optimally, in equilibrium too little debt is used. We also show that introducing more
liquidity into the system can be counter-productive: although it reduces the severity
of fire sales, it also reduces welfare.
JEL Nos: D5, D6, G32, G33
Keywords: Debt, equity, capital structure, default, market liquidity, constrained
ineﬃcient, incomplete markets
1 Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the current sovereign debt crisis in Europe have focused
attention on the macroeconomic consequences of debt financing. In this paper, we turn our
attention to the use of debt finance in the corporate sector and study the general-equilibrium
eﬀects of debt finance on investment and growth. More precisely, we show that there is
underinvestment in equilibrium when markets are incomplete and firms use debt and equity
to finance investment.
At the heart of our analysis is the determination of the firm’s capital structure. In
the classical model of Modigliani and Miller (1958), capital structure is indeterminate. To
obtain a determinate capital structure, subsequent authors appealed to market frictions, such
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as distortionary taxes, bankruptcy costs, and agency costs.1 We follow this tradition and
assume the optimal capital structure balances the tax advantages of debt against the risk of
costly bankruptcy. Debt has a tax advantage because interest is not subject to the corporate
income tax. Bankruptcy is perceived as costly because it forces the firm to sell assets at
fire-sale prices. The firm will balance the perceived costs of debt and equity in choosing its
capital structure and we will see that these two costs support an interior optimum for the
capital structure.
In our model, both the corporate income tax and the cost of bankruptcy represent a
pure redistribution of resources rather than a burden on consumers. The corporate income
tax revenue is returned to consumers in the form of lump sum transfers. Similarly, bank-
ruptcy results in a fire sale of assets, but this is a transfer of value from creditors to the
shareholders of the solvent firms that buy the assets. Moreover, we consider an environment
with a representative consumer, so that a redistribution of resources has no eﬀect on welfare.
Nonetheless, a rational, value-maximizing manager of a competitive firm will perceive the
tax as a cost of using equity finance and the risk of a fire sale in bankruptcy as a cost of using
debt. These perceived costs act like a tax on capital and distort the investment decision.
The economy We assume that time is discrete and the horizon is infinite. There are two
commodities at each date, a perishable consumption good and a durable capital good. The
economy consists of two productive sectors, one for each commodity. The consumption good
is the sole input for the production of capital goods, which is subject to decreasing returns
to scale. Capital goods are the sole input for the production of consumption goods, which
is subject to constant returns to scale.
Production of the capital good is instantaneous, so firms in the capital-producing sector
choose inputs and outputs to maximize profits at each date. The profits are distributed to
consumers. The consumption producing sector, by contrast, requires long-lived capital as an
input. To finance the purchase of capital, firms issue debt and equity. Constant returns to
scale ensure that interest, dividends and retained earnings as well as corporate tax payments
exhaust the firm’s revenue in each period. Production and the capital structure of a firm are
chosen by its manager so as to maximize the firm’s market value, which is the sum of the
market value of the debt and equity outstanding.
The representative consumer maximizes the discounted sum of lifetime utilities. He
decides how much of his income to consume or save at each date, using savings to purchase
debt and equity issued by firms, and receives the dividends and interest payments on the
securities purchased in the past.
Bankruptcy In order to allow for the possibility of bankruptcy, we assume that the pro-
duction of consumption goods is subject to productivity shocks in the form of stochastic
depreciation of capital. Of course, default and bankruptcy are only possible if the firm issues
1See, for example, Barnea, Haugen and Senbet (1981), Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984), Brennan and
Schwartz (1978), Dammon and Green (1987), Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989), Kim (1982), Leland and
Toft (1996), Miller (1977), and Titman (1984) and Titman and Wessels (1988).
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a positive amount of debt. We follow Gale and Gottardi (2011) in modeling the bankruptcy
process as an extensive-form game consisting of three stages: renegotiation, liquidation and
settlement. A firm in distress first attempts to restructure its debt by making an oﬀer to
exchange new debt and equity claims for the old debt. If the attempt to renegotiate the
debt fails, i.e., the creditors reject the firm’s oﬀer, then and only then will the firm be forced
to liquidate its assets. The firm’s assets are sold on a competitive capital market and the
liquidated value is paid to the creditors in the settlement stage.
There always exists a sub-game perfect equilibrium of the renegotiation game in which
all creditors reject the firm’s oﬀer and renegotiation fails. To eliminate such trivial failures of
the bankruptcy process, we consider here the case where renegotiation succeeds if and only
if there exists a sub-game perfect equilibrium in which a feasible oﬀer is accepted. With this
qualification, the bankruptcy process has a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium in which
the firm fails to renegotiate its debt if and only if the present value of the liquidated assets
is less than the face value of the debt. In other words, the debt can be rolled over unless the
firm is insolvent in this sense.
Bankruptcy procedures have numerous flaws (see Bebchuk, 1988; Aghion, Hart and
Moore, 1992; Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). In the present model, we focus on one poten-
tial source of market failure, the so-called finance constraint, which requires buyers to pay
for their purchases of assets with the funds (cash) available to them, not with the issue of
IOUs. Hence the potential buyer who values the assets most highly may not be able to raise
enough finance to purchase the assets at their full economic value.
In our highly simplified environment, all potential buyers value the assets symmetrically,
so the only friction is the finance constraint. Thus bankruptcy is “costly” only in the sense
that assets sold oﬀ in an illiquid market may fetch less than full economic value: if the finance
constraint is binding, the market price of the assets is determined by the amount of cash in
the market, rather than by economic fundamentals. Despite this friction, bankruptcy is ex
post eﬃcient. Assets sold at fire sale prices represent a transfer of value from creditors to
buyers, rather than a deadweight loss. Notice that the illiquidity of the asset market and the
cost of bankruptcy are endogenously determined in equilibrium. If there is enough liquidity,
there will be no loss from fire sales.
Capital structure As a baseline, we use the “frictionless” case in which the corporate
income tax rate is zero. In that case,
i. The competitive equilibrium allocation is Pareto eﬃcient and maximizes the utility of
the representative agent subject to the resource feasibility constraints.
ii. The equilibrium capital structure of firms is indeterminate, subject only to the con-
straint that the amount of debt must be small enough that there is no risk of costly
bankruptcy.
With a zero corporate income tax rate, the finance constraint never “binds” and bank-
ruptcy is not “costly.” When the corporate income tax rate is positive, we get quite diﬀerent
results.
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i0. Equilibrium is constrained ineﬃcient.
ii
0
. The optimal capital structure is uniquely determined in equilibrium and firms are
financed by positive amounts of risky debt and equity.
iii
0
. Each firm faces a positive probability of bankruptcy and bankruptcy is costly in the
sense that the liquidated value of the firm is less than its fundamental or economic
value as a going concern.
It is interesting that the introduction of a single friction (the positive corporate tax rate)
changes so many features of the equilibrium. The intuition for point iii0. is simple. If
debt were not risky (the probability of bankruptcy equaled zero) or bankruptcy were not
costly (bankrupt firms could be liquidated with no loss of value), then firms would use 100%
debt finance to avoid the corporate income tax. But, in equilibrium, 100% debt finance is
inconsistent with both a zero probability of bankruptcy and no fire sales for bankrupt assets.
A similar argument establishes point ii0. If firms used 100% equity finance, there would
be no bankruptcy and hence no fire sales. But this means that a single firm could issue a
small amount of debt at no cost in terms of bankruptcy and benefit from the tax hedge.
The uniqueness of the capital structure follows from the fact that a rational manager will
equate the marginal costs of debt and equity financing in equilibrium and, under reasonable
conditions, the marginal costs are increasing.
Constrained ineﬃciency The main contribution of the paper is the analysis of welfare
in the presence of distortions. The equilibrium is not just Pareto ineﬃcient when the tax
rate is positive (point i0. above); more interestingly, it is also constrained ineﬃcient. We
conduct two experiments to illustrate the scope for welfare-improving interventions. First,
we consider a policy of controlling the level of investment. An increase in investment relative
to its equilibrium level increases welfare by bringing the capital stock closer to the first best.
Second, we consider a policy of controlling the probability of bankruptcy by manipulating
the capital structure. Modifying the capital structure so as to increase the probability of
bankruptcy above its equilibrium level increases welfare by increasing investment, which
again brings the capital stock closer to the first best level. Thus, contrary to what one
might expect, there is not too much instability, but too little, in equilibrium. This seems to
contradict the common intuition that firms have an incentive to use too much debt financing
because of the tax deductibility of interest.
The fact that there is too little bankruptcy risk and, presumably, too little debt, is
surprising. There are two distortions in the model, one working to increase debt finance (the
tax advantage) and the other working to reduce it (the risk of costly bankruptcy). It seems
that the distortion could go either way, too much or too little debt. Nonetheless, given a
fixed distortion in the form of the corporation tax rate, the optimal intervention is to increase
the risk of bankruptcy. At the very least, this should give us pause when evaluating claims
that less debt finance is a “good thing.”
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To get some intuition for this, notice that, from the point of view of the firm, the impact of
these two distortions or costs (as they are perceived by the firm), appears to be asymmetric.
A solvent firm makes capital gains when it buys up the assets of liquidated firms at a fire
sale price. Hence, in equilibrium, the losses made by firms when they are insolvent are oﬀset
by the capital gains earned in the states where they are solvent. In fact, as we shall see,
the value of the firm in steady state is not aﬀected by the severity of the fire sales. The
corporate income tax, on the other hand, does aﬀect the value of the firm: the revenue is
recycled to the consumers, who also happen to be shareholders of the firm, but does not
appear on the firm’s income and loss statement. Thus, in equilibrium, it is only the tax
that depresses the value of the firm below its first-best value and causes underinvestment.
Indeed, increasing the ratio of debt to equity so that the firm approaches 100% debt finance,
one can approximate the first best in the limit, even if that means that default becomes
more likely for each firm and the fire sales become more extreme.
Ineﬃcient provision of liquidity One limitation of the basic model considered is that
the only source of liquidity, of “cash” in the market for liquidated assets, is the output of
the consumption good by solvent firms. It might be thought that introducing assets that
are liquid, but yield lower returns, and allowing firms to accumulate them would relax the
finance constraint and reduce the ineﬃciency associated with the cost of default. In fact, we
show that the ineﬃciency of the equilibrium may increase.
More specifically, we introduce an alternative technology that produces the consumption
good using the capital good. This technology also exhibits constant returns to scale but
has a deterministic depreciation rate (equal to the expected depreciation rate of the risky
technology) and a lower productivity. We show that it is never optimal for a firm to combine
the two technologies: a firm either invests all its capital in the safe technology or invests
all its capital in the risky technology. Provided the productivity of the safe technology is
not too low, both technologies are used in equilibrium and earn the same return on capital:
firms operating the safe technology make capital gains in the fire sales that compensate for
the lower productivity of their capital.
The presence of firms using the safe technology increases the liquidity available in the
market, which raises the liquidation price of capital. This in turn induces firms adopting
the risky technology to issue more debt, so that fire sales remain an equilibrium phenom-
enon. Moreover, the presence of safe firms divert capital gains from solvent risky firms, thus
reducing the return on capital for the latter firms. The fact that safe firms have a lower
productivity of capital entails a real cost for the economy. However, increased liquidity in
the system causes risky firms to issue more debt, which, as we saw, is beneficial for welfare.
Hence, when the productivity of the safe technology is not too low, so that it is used
in equilibrium, but still suﬃciently lower than that of the risky technology, the first eﬀect
prevails and everyone is worse oﬀ in equilibrium when the safe technology is introduced.
There is thus too much liquidity rather than too little. In contrast, when the productivity of
the safe technology is close to that of the risky one, introducing this technology is beneficial
as it yields an allocation close to the Pareto eﬃcient one. Thus, we get the interesting
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feature that equilibrium welfare is non monotonic in the level of the productivity of the safe
technology.
Properties of equilibria In the environment considered, we are able to characterize the
steady-state equilibrium of the model, demonstrate its existence and uniqueness, and estab-
lish some comparative static properties.
We also study the non-steady-state behavior of the model in the special case where
the representative consumer is risk neutral. We show that the equilibrium probability of
bankruptcy, the price of capital, the fundamental value of capital and the level of investment
are always equal to their steady-state values. The only variable that moves outside of the
steady state is the capital stock, which converges to its steady-state value. Thus, at least
in this special case, the globally stable steady state uniquely characterizes the equilibrium
level of all variables other than the capital stock.
1.1 Related literature
In a representative agent economy without distortions, competitive equilibrium is eﬃcient
because the agent’s decision problem is identical to the planner’s problem. In the presence of
distortionary taxes, the situation is very diﬀerent: there may exist multiple, Pareto-ineﬃcient
equilibria (Foster and Sonnenschein, 1970). Here we find a unique Pareto-ineﬃcient equilib-
rium in spite of the presence of a representative consumer. Although consumers collectively
own all the assets, individual managers’ decisions are distorted by the presence of taxes and
bankruptcy costs. Thus, even though tax revenues are returned to consumers and consumers
end up holding the same assets after liquidation, the distortion of investment decisions im-
poses a welfare cost on the economy. Gale and Gottardi (2011) found similar results in a
static model in which all investment was 100% debt financed.
The classical literature on the firm’s investment decision excludes external finance con-
straints and bankruptcy costs and uses adjustment costs to explain the reliance of investment
on Tobin’s  (see Eberly, Rebelo and Vincent, 2008, for a contemporary example). The new
wave literature on investment, exemplified by Sundaresan and Wang (2006) and Bolton,
Chen and Wang (2009), incorporates frictions of various types, such as agency costs and dis-
tress costs of debt. Hackbarth and Mauer (2012) investigate the interaction of financing and
investment in a model where there are multiple debt issues with possibly diﬀerent seniority.
These papers study an individual firm in partial equilibrium, rather than a large number of
firms in general equilibrium.
Gomes and Schmid (2010) study a “tractable general equilibrium model with heteroge-
neous firms making optimal investment and financing decisions.” Kuehn and Schmid (2011)
allow for endogenous assets in a structural model of default to account for credit risk. Miao
and Wang (2010) develop a DSGE model of default and credit risk and calibrate it to match
the persistence and volatility of output growth as well as credit spreads. All of these models
assume a representative consumer and a continuum of heterogenous firms and use compu-
tational methods to derive the equilibrium properties of the model. We endogenize the cost
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of bankruptcy through the finance constraint in the market for liquidated assets, whereas
these papers take the cost of bankruptcy as exogenous.
The interaction between illiquidity and incompleteness of asset markets is also studied in
the literature on banking and financial crises. For models of fire sales and their impact on
bank portfolios, see Allen and Gale (2004a, 2004b).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the primitives
of the model and characterize the first-best allocation that would be implemented by a
planner seeking to maximize the welfare of the representative agent. In Section 3 we describe
the firms, markets and other institutions of the economy. Section 4 contains a reduced-
form description of equilibrium. Section 4.1 contains the characterization of steady-state
equilibrium, shows that it existence and uniqueness and provides some comparative static
results. Section 5 contains an analysis of non-steady-state paths. Section 6 shows that
the first best can be achieved when there is no tax on equity and then investigates the
constrained ineﬃciency of equilibrium. This section also contains an extension of the model
to allow for a safe technology and shows that its introduction may be welfare decreasing. A
brief conclusion follows. All proofs are collected in the appendix.
2 The Economy
We consider an infinite horizon production economy. Time is described by a countable
sequence of dates,  = 0 1 . At each date there are two goods, a perishable consumption
good and a durable capital good.
2.1 Consumers
There is a unit mass of identical, infinitely-lived consumers. The consumption stream of the
representative consumer is denoted by c = (0 1 ) ≥ 0, where  is the amount of the
consumption good consumed at date . For any c ≥ 0, the representative consumer’s utility
is denoted by  (c) and given by
 (c) =
∞X
=0
() (1)
where 0    1 and  : R+ → R has the usual properties: it is 2 and such that 0 ()  0
and 00 ()  0 for any  ≥ 0.
2.2 Production
There are two production sectors in the economy. In one, capital is produced using the
consumption good as an input. In the other, the consumption good is produced using the
capital good as an input.
7
Capital goods sector There is a unit mass of firms operating the technology for producing
capital, given by a decreasing-returns-to-scale production function. If  ≥ 0 is the amount
of the consumption good used as an input at date , the output is  () ≥ 0 units of
capital at the end of the period, where  () is a 2 function that satisfies 0 ()  0 and
00 ()  0, for any  ≥ 0, as well as the following Inada conditions: lim→0 0 () =∞ and
lim→∞ 0 () = 0.
Consumption goods sector The technology for producing the consumption good ex-
hibits constant returns to scale. Each unit of capital used as an input at the beginning of
date  produces (instantaneously)   0 units of output. Production in this sector is under-
taken by a large number of firms which diﬀer for the fact that the capital good depreciates
with stochastic depreciation rates: the depreciation rates are assumed to be i.i.d. across
firms with mean 1 − ¯. For the purpose of characterizing the eﬃcient allocation, we can
ignore therefore the heterogeneity and assume the average depreciation is deterministic, so
for every unit of capital used in production at the beginning of date , ¯ units remain after
production is completed.
2.3 Feasible allocations
At date 0, there is an initial stock of capital goods ¯0  0. A (symmetric) allocation is given
by a sequence {  }∞=0 that specifies the consumption , capital , and investment 
at each date . The allocation {  }∞=0 is feasible if, for every date  = 0 1 , it satisfies
non-negativity,
(  ) ≥ 0 (2)
attainability for the consumption good,
 +  ≤  (3)
and the law of motion for capital,
+1 = ¯ +  ()  (4)
together with the initial condition 0 = ¯0.
It follows from the assumptions regarding the technology for producing the capital good
that there exists a unique level of the capital stock, 0  ˆ ∞, satisfying the condition

³
ˆ
´
=
¡
1− ¯¢ ˆ.
That is, the capital stock ˆ remains constant when all the output of the consumption good
is used for investment. It is then straightforward to show that ˆ constitutes an upper bound
on the permanently feasible levels of the stock of capital.
Proposition 1 At any feasible allocation {  }∞=0, we have lim sup→∞  ≤ ˆ.
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As a corollary, ˆ is an upper bound on the levels of consumption and investment that can
be maintained indefinitely:
lim sup
→∞
 ≤ ˆ lim sup→∞  ≤ ˆ
2.4 Eﬃcient allocations
A first-best, socially optimal allocation maximizes the utility of the representative consumer
within the set of feasible allocations. More precisely, it is a sequence {  }∞=0 that solves
the problem of maximizing the representative consumer’s utility (1) subject to the feasibility
constraints (2), (3), (4).
To characterize the properties of the first best, consider the necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for an interior solution
¡     ¢À 0  = 0 1  of this problem, for every,
0 ¡ ¢ = 
+1+ +1¯ = 
and
0
¡ ¢ = 
for some non-negative multipliers {( )}∞=0  together with the feasibility conditions (2-4)
and the initial condition 0 = ¯0. The boundedness property established above implies that
the transversality condition
lim→∞
∞X
=
 () = 0
is automatically satisfied.
Much of our analysis focuses on steady states, that is on allocations such that
(  ) = (  )
for all . It is interesting to see what the above first-order conditions imply for an optimal
steady state:
Proposition 2 At an optimal steady state, the capital stock is given by
 = 
¡¢
1− ¯  (5)
where ∗ is determined by 
1− ¯ =
1
0 ()  (6)
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Equation (6) has a natural interpretation in terms of marginal costs and benefits. The
marginal revenue of a unit of capital at the end of period 0 is

1− ¯ = + 
2¯+   + ¯−1
because it produces ¯−1 units of the consumption good at each date   0 and the present
value of that consumption is ¯−1. The marginal cost of a unit of capital is 10() units
of consumption at date 0. So optimality requires the equality of marginal cost and marginal
revenue.
3 An incomplete markets economy
We study next competitive market equilibria, specifying the structure of markets available
and analyzing the decision problem of individual firms and consumers.
3.1 Firms
In the capital goods sector, since production is instantaneous and there is no capital, firms
simply maximize current profits in each period.
In the consumption sector, there is a continuum of infinitely-lived firms. The capital of
each firm is subject to a distinct depreciation shock , which is assumed to be i.i.d. across
firms as well as over time. Hence firms, while ex ante identical, are diﬀerent ex post. The
random variable  has support [0 1] and a continuous p.d.f.  (). We denote the c.d.f. by
 (). By the law of large numbers convention, there is no aggregate uncertainty and the
aggregate depreciation rate is constant. The fraction of the capital stock that remains after
depreciation is therefore equal to ¯, the expected value of . If the aggregate capital stock
in the economy is  ≥ 0 at the beginning of date , the total output of consumption good at
 is  and the total amount of capital remaining after production has taken place is ¯.
The only additional condition we impose on the distribution  () is that the hazard rate
()
1− () is increasing.
Given the CRTS nature of the technology the size of individual firms as well as the mass
of firms active in this sector is indeterminate. Moreover, since we allow for bankruptcy and
the entry of new firms, the mass of active firms may change over time. To simplify the
description of equilibrium, we will assume that a combination of entry and exit maintains
the mass of firms equal to unity and that firms adjust their size so that each has the same
amount of capital. Given the indeterminacy above, this is clearly without loss of generality
and allows us to describe the evolution of the economy in terms of a representative firm with
capital stock .
At the initial date  = 0, we assume that all capital is owned by firms in the consumption
good sector and that each of these firms has been previously financed entirely by equity.
Each consumer has an equal shareholding in each firm in the two sectors.
10
3.2 Renegotiation and default
In a frictionless environment, where firms have access to a complete set of contingent markets
to borrow against their future income stream and hedge the idiosyncratic depreciation shocks,
the first-best allocation can be decentralized, in the usual way, as a perfectly competitive
equilibrium.
In what follows, we consider instead an environment with frictions, where the first best
is typically not attainable. More specifically, in this environment there are no markets for
contingent claims, the firms’ output is sold in spot markets for goods and firms are financed
only with (short-term) debt and equity.
In the presence of uncertainty regarding the depreciation rate of the firm’s capital, debt
financing gives rise to the risk of bankruptcy, which may be costly. In the event of default, in
fact, firms are required to liquidate their assets by selling them to the solvent firms. These
firms may be finance-constrained in equilibrium and whenever this happens there will be a
fire sale, in which assets are sold for less than their full economic value.
Equity financing, in contrast, entails no bankruptcy risk. The cost of equity is that firms
must pay a linear (distortionary) tax on equity’s returns. We assume for simplicity that the
revenue of the tax on equity is used to make an equal lump sum transfer to all consumers.
A firm producing the consumption good must then choose each period the optimal com-
position between debt and equity financing of its purchases of capital, by trading oﬀ the
costs and benefits of these two financial instruments. To analyze this decision formally we
must first describe more in detail the structure of markets and the timing of the decisions
taken within each period by firms and consumers.
Each date  is divided into three sub-periods, labeled , , and .
A. At the beginning of each period (sub-period ), the production of the consumption
good occurs and the realization of the depreciation shock of each firm  is learnt.
Also, the debt liabilities of each firm are due. The firm has three options: it can
repay the debt, renegotiate (“roll over”) the debt, or default and declare bankruptcy.
Renegotiation takes place via the game described in the next section, where the firm
makes a take it or leave it oﬀer to its bond holders and they simultaneously choose
whether to accept or reject. Non defaulting firms may then distribute their earnings
to equity holders or retain them to finance new purchases of capital.
B. In the intermediate sub-period (), the market opens where bankrupt firms can sell
their assets (their capital). A liquidity constraint applies, so that only agents with
resources readily available, either solvent firms who retained earnings in sub-period 
or consumers who received dividends in sub—period , can purchase the assets on sale.
Let  denote the market price of the liquidated capital.
C. In the final sub-period (), the production of capital goods occurs. The profits of the
firms who operate in this sector are then distributed to the consumers who own them.
In addition, debt holders of defaulting firms receive the proceeds of the liquidation sales
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in sub-period B. The taxes on equity’s returns are due and the lump sum transfers to
consumers are also made in this sub-period. All other markets open; spot markets,
where the consumption and the capital goods are traded, at a price respectively 1 and
 as well as asset markets, where debt and equity issued by firms (both surviving
and newly formed) to acquire capital are traded. The consumers buy and sell these
securities in order to fund future consumption and rebalance their portfolios.
3.2.1 Sub-period A: The renegotiation game
Consider a firm with  units of capital at the beginning of period . The firm produces 
units of the consumption good, has outstanding debt with face value ,2 and learns the
realization of its depreciation shock . The renegotiation process that occurs in sub-period
 between the firm and the creditors who purchased the firm’s bonds at − 1 is represented
by a two-stage game. Without loss of generality, we analyze the renegotiation game for the
case where the firm has one unit of capital, i.e.,  = 1.
S1 The firm makes a “take it or leave it” oﬀer to the bond holders to rollover the debt,
replacing each unit of the maturing debt with face value  with a combination of
equity and debt maturing the following period. The new face value of the debt, +1,
determines the firm’s capital structure since equity is just a claim to the residual value.
S2 The creditors simultaneously accept or reject the firm’s oﬀer.
Two conditions must be satisfied in order for renegotiation to succeed. First, a majority
of the creditors must accept the oﬀer. Second, the rest of the creditors must be paid oﬀ
in full. If either condition is not satisfied, the renegotiation fails and the firm is declared
bankrupt. In that event, all the assets of the firm are frozen, nothing is distributed until
the capital stock has been liquidated (sold in the market). After liquidation, the sale price
of the liquidated assets is distributed to the bond holders in sub-period . Obviously, there
is nothing left for the shareholders in this case. Hence default is always involuntary: a firm
acting so as to maximize its market value will always repay or roll over the debt unless it is
unable to do so.
We show next that there is an equilibrium where renegotiation succeeds if and only if
 ≤ (+ )  (7)
that is, if the value of the firm’s equity is negative when its capital is evaluated at its
liquidation price . Note that the condition is independent of . Consider, with no loss of
generality, the case of an individual creditor holding debt with face value . If he rejects
the oﬀer and demands to be repaid immediately, he receives  in sub-period . With this
payment he can purchase  units of capital in sub-period . If the firm manages to roll
2Here and in what follows, it is convenient to denote by  the face value of the debt issued per unit of
capital acquired.
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over the debt, it can retain  and purchase  units of capital in sub-period . Then it will
have  +  units of capital at the end of the period. Therefore the most that the firm can
oﬀer the creditor is a claim to an amount of capital  +  at the end of the period, with
market value 
³

 + 
´
. So the firm’s oﬀer will be accepted only if the creditor rejecting
the oﬀer ends up with no more capital than by accepting, that is,

 ≤

 + 
which is equivalent to (7). If (7) is satisfied, there exists a sub-game perfect equilibrium
of the renegotiation game in which the entrepreneur makes an acceptable oﬀer worth  to
the creditors and all of them accept. To see this, note first that the shareholders receive
a non-negative payoﬀ from rolling over the debt, whereas they get nothing in the event of
default, and the creditors will not accept a lower oﬀer. Second, the creditors will accept the
oﬀer of  because they cannot get a higher payoﬀ by deviating and rejecting it. Thus, we
have the following simple result.
Proposition 3 There exists a sub-game perfect equilibrium of the renegotiation game in
which the debt is renegotiated if and only if (7) is satisfied.
Proposition 3 leaves open the possibility that renegotiation may fail even if (7) is satisfied.
Indeed it is the case that if every creditor rejects the oﬀer, it is optimal for every creditor
to reject the oﬀer because a single vote has no eﬀect. In the sequel, we ignore this trivial
coordination failure among lenders and assume that renegotiation succeeds whenever (7) is
satisfied. We do this because we want to focus on non-trivial coordination failures.
3.2.2 Sub-period B: Liquidation
Let  denote the break even value of , implicitly defined by the following equation
 ≡ +  (8)
Thus a firm is bankrupt if and only if   . When all firms active at the beginning of
date  have the same size (), the supply of capital to be liquidated by bankrupt firms in
sub-period  is Z 
0
 () 
It is a matter of indiﬀerence to shareholders whether solvent firms retain earnings or pay
them out as dividends, since shareholders can sell shares to finance consumption and the
manager operates the firm in the shareholders’ interests. There is no loss of generality,
therefore, in assuming that solvent firms ( ≥ ) retain all of their earnings and have them
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available to purchase capital in sub-period . The amount of resources available to purchase
capital in sub-period  is so

Z 1

 ()  =  (1−  ()) 
If , the price of capital in sub-period , is greater than , the price of capital in sub-period
, no firm will buy capital at the price  and the market cannot clear. This means that
market clearing requires  ≤  and

Z 
0
 ()  ≤  (1−  ())  (9)
with (9) holding with equality if   , in which case all the available resources must be
oﬀered in exchange for liquidated capital.
3.2.3 Sub-period C: Settlement, investment and trades
Capital sector decisions The decision of the firms operating in the capital goods sector,
in sub-period , is simple. At any date  the representative firm chooses  ≥ 0 to maximize
current profits,  ()−. Because of the concavity of the production function, a necessary
and suﬃcient condition for the input  to be optimal is
0 () ≤ 1 (10)
with strict equality if   0.
The profits from the capital sector,  = sup≥0 { ()− }, are paid to consumers in
the same sub-period.
Consumption sector decisions In the consumption goods sector, the firm’s decision is
more complicated because the production of consumption goods requires durable capital,
which generates returns that repay the investment over time. So the firm has to issue
securities to finance the purchase of capital. As we explained above, the number and size
of firms in this sector are indeterminate because of constant returns to scale. We consider a
symmetric equilibrium in which, at any date, a unit mass of firms are active and all of them
have the same size, given by  units of capital3 at the end of date .
The representative firm chooses its capital structure to maximize its market value, that
is the value of the outstanding debt and the equity claims on the firm. This capital structure
is summarized by the break even point +1. Whenever the firm’s depreciation shock next
period +1  +1, the firm defaults next period and its value is equal to the value of the firm’s
3Because of the default of a fraction of the firms, the surviving firms who acquire their capital may grow
in size in sub-period , but are then indiﬀerent between buying or selling capital at  in sub-period 
Hence we can always consider a situation where the mass of active firms remains unchanged over time, while
their size varies with 
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liquidated assets, ++1+1. If +1  +1, the firm is solvent and can use its earnings  to
purchase capital at the price +1. Then the final value of the firm is +1
³

+1 + +1
´
, from
which the amount due for the tax on equity’s returns must be subtracted. The corporate
income tax rate is denoted by   0 and the tax base is assumed to be the value of the firm’s
equity at the beginning of sub-period  whenever it is non negative.
To calculate the value of equity, we need two components. The first is the value of capital
owned by the firm, 
³

 + 
´
. The second is the value of the (renegotiated) debt, 
³

´
.
The tax base is the diﬀerence between these two values,

µ
 + 
¶
− 
µ

¶

Hence, the tax payment due at date + 1 is
 max
½
+1
µ 
+1 + +1
¶
− +1
µ+1
+1
¶
 0
¾
=  max
½+1
+1 (+ +1+1 − +1)  0
¾

and the expected value of the firm at date + 1 isZ +1
0
(+ +1+1)  +
Z 1
+1
∙
+1
µ 
+1 + +1
¶
−  +1+1 (+ +1 − +1)
¸
 (11)
Because there is no aggregate uncertainty and there is a continuum of firms oﬀering debt
and equity subject to idiosyncratic shocks, diversified debt and equity are risk-free and must
bear the same rate of return. Denoting by  the risk-free interest rate between date  and
+ 1, the present value of the firm at  is given by the expression in (11) divided by 1 + .
Hence the firm’s problem consists in the choice of its capital structure, as summarized by
+1, so as to maximize the following objective function
1
1 + 
½Z +1
0
(+ +1+1)  +
Z 1
+1
∙
+1
µ 
+1 + +1
¶
− +1 (+1 − +1)
¸

¾
(12)
where we used (8) to substitute for +1. The value of the firm at an optimum is then equal
to the market value of capital, . The solution of the firm’s problem in (12) has a fairly
simple characterization:
Proposition 4 There is a unique solution  for the firm’s optimal capital structure, given
by +1 = 0 when
³
1− +1+1
´
 (0) ≥  and by 0    1 satisfyingµ
1− +1+1
¶
(+ +1+1)  (+1)
1−  (+1) = 
when
³
1− +1+1
´
 (0)   .
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The consumption savings decision The representative consumer has an income flow
given by the initial endowment of capital 0 and the payment of the profits  of the firms in
the capital good sector and of the lump sum transfers  by the government at every date.
Since he faces no income risk and can fully diversify, as we said, the idiosyncratic income
risk of equity and corporate debt, the consumer eﬀectively only trades each period a riskless
asset. His choice problem reduces then to the maximization of the discounted stream of
utility subject to the lifetime budget constraint:
max
P∞
=0  ()
s.t. 0 +P∞=1  = 0 + 0¯0 + 0 +P∞=1  ( + )  (13)
where  =Q−1=0 11+ is the discount rate between date 0 and date t, given the access to risk
free borrowing and lending each period at the rate .4
Market clearing The market-clearing condition for the consumption good is
 +  =  for all  ≥ 0 (14)
The markets for debt and equity clear at any  if the amount of wealth the households want
to carry forward into the next period is equal to the value of debt and equity issued by firms
in that period. We show in the appendix that the market-clearing condition for the securities
markets is automatically satisfied if the market-clearing condition for the goods market (14)
is satisfied. This is just an application of Walras’ law.
Finally, the market for capital clears if
+1 = ¯ +  () (15)
4 Equilibrium
We are now ready to state the equations defining a competitive equilibrium in the environ-
ment described.
Definition 5 A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of values
©¡∗  ∗  ∗+1 ∗  ∗+1 ∗  ∗ ¢ª∞=0
satisfying the following conditions:
1. Profit maximization in the capital good sector. For every date  ≥ 0, ∗
solves:
∗0 (∗ ) ≤ 1 and (∗0 (∗ )− 1) ∗ = 0
4The value of the initial endowment of capital 0 equals the value of the output 0 produced with this
capital in sub-period  plus the value of the capital left after depreciation in sub-period , ¯00. Also,
while producers of capital good operate and hence distribute profits in every period  ≥ 0 the first equity
issue is at the end of date 0 and hence the first tax revenue on equity earnings is at date  = 1
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2. Optimal capital structure. For every date  ≥ 0, the capital structure ∗+1 of the
firms in the consumption good sector satisfies:µ
1− 
∗+1
∗+1
¶¡+ ∗+1∗+1¢  ¡∗+1¢1−  ¡∗+1¢ =  
and the present value of the firms in this sector satisfies the law of motion
(1 + ∗ ) ∗ =
½Z ∗+1
0
¡+ ∗+1+1¢  +Z 1
∗+1
µ
∗+1
µ 
∗+1 + +1
¶
− ∗+1 (+1 − +1)
¶

)
3. Optimal consumption. The sequence {∗}∞=0 satisfies the following first-order condi-
tions 0 ¡∗+1¢
0(∗ ) =
1
1 + ∗ 
for every date  ≥ 0, together with the budget constraint
∗0 +
∞X
=1
Ã−1Y
=0
1
1 + ∗
!
∗ = 0 + ∗0 ¯0 + ∗0(∗0 )− ∗0+
∞X
=1
Ã−1Y
=0
1
1 + ∗
!Ã
∗ ∗
Z 1
∗
( − ∗ )  ()  + ∗ (∗ )− ∗
!
4. Liquidation market clearing. For every date   0, the asset market clears in
sub-period :
∗ ≤ ∗ and ∗
Z ∗
0
 ≤ 
Z 1
∗
 , with equality if ∗ = ∗
5. Goods market clearing. For every date  ≥ 0, the goods market clears in sub-period
:
∗ = ∗ + ∗ 
6. Capital market clearing. For every date  ≥ 0, the sequence {∗ } satisfies the law
of motion
∗+1 = ¯∗ +  (∗ )
and ∗0 = ¯0.
17
Condition 1 requires firms in the capital goods sector to maximize profits at every date,
taking the price of capital goods ∗ as given. Condition 2 requires firms in the consumption
goods sector to choose their capital structures optimally. Here we assume that the optimal
capital structure occurs at an interior solution 0  ∗  1. In fact, this is implied by
Proposition 4 and the market-clearing condition for sub-period  (equation (9)). The law
of motion for the value of the firm is simply the Bellman equation associated with the
maximization problem in equation (12). Condition 3 requires that the consumption path
solves the consumers’ maximization problem (13) at every date. Conditions 4 — 6 are the
market-clearing conditions for the liquidated capital goods in sub-period  and for capital
goods and consumption goods in sub-period . These conditions follow from equations (9),
(15), and (14), respectively.
The equilibrium market prices of equity ∗ and debt ∗ at any date  are readily ob-
tained from the other equilibrium variables. The returns on diversified equity and debt are
deterministic, because there is no aggregate uncertainty. The rate of return on diversified
debt must be equal to the rate of return on diversified equity. Thus, ∗ and ∗ must be
such that the one-period expected returns on debt and equity are equal to the risk free rate.
Putting together the market-clearing condition (9) for liquidated capital in sub-period 
with the optimality conditions for the firms in the consumption good sector (Proposition 4),
we see that in equilibrium we must have an interior optimum for the firms’ capital structure,
 ∈ (0 1), and   . Thus, default is costly and occurs with probability strictly between
zero and one:
0   ()  1
Intuitively, if default were costless firms would choose 100% debt financing, but this implies
default with probability one, which is inconsistent with market clearing. Similarly, 100%
equity financing implies that there is no default and hence default is costless, so firms should
use 100% debt financing instead. The only remaining alternative is a mixture of debt and
equity and costly default.
We also see from the previous analysis that uncertainty only aﬀects the returns and
default decisions of individual firms. All other equilibrium variables, aggregate consumption,
investment and market prices are deterministic.
4.1 Steady-state equilibria
Definition 6 A steady state is a competitive equilibrium {(∗  ∗  ∗  ∗  ∗  ∗  ∗ )}∞=0 in
which for all  ≥ 0
(∗  ∗  ∗  ∗  ∗  ∗  ∗ ) = (∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗) 
The conditions defining a steady state are readily obtained by substituting the stationarity
restrictions into Conditions 1 — 6 of Definition 5 of a competitive equilibrium.
Our first result shows that a steady state exists and is unique. In addition, the system
of conditions defining a steady state can be reduced to a system of two equations.
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Proposition 7 Under the maintained assumptions, there exists a unique steady-state equi-
librium, obtained as a solution of the following system of equations:
∗ = (1−  (
∗))R ∗
0
()  (16)
∗ = 
1− ¯ +  R 1∗( − ∗)  (17)µ
1− 
∗
∗
¶
(+ ∗∗)  (
∗)
1−  (∗) =   (18)
In a steady state, the risk free rate ∗ is determined by the condition that the interest
rate equals the subjective rate of time preference:
1
1 + ∗ = 
Having simplified the system of equations defining a steady state, we can also identify
some of its comparative static properties.
Proposition 8 (i) An increase in the tax rate  increases the steady value of ∗ (and hence
the debt-equity ratio) and reduces the one of ∗, but the eﬀect on ∗ (and hence ∗ and ∗)
is ambiguous.
(ii) An increase in the discount factor  decreases the steady-state value of ∗ (and hence the
debt-equity ratio) and increases the one of ∗ as well of ∗, so that ∗ and ∗ increase too.
To get some intuition for the these results, consider in particular the case of an increase in
the tax rate  . This increases the cost of equity financing, so that firms shift to higher debt
financing, thus decreasing the liquidity available in sub-period B and hence the liquidation
value of defaulting firms. While the direct eﬀect of the higher tax rate is clearly to decrease
, as we see from (17) the increase in debt financing () induced by the higher tax always
raises , hence the ambiguity of the overall eﬀect on 
5 Transition dynamics
The main focus of the rest of the paper will be on the welfare properties of equilibria, in
particular on the eﬃciency of the investment and capital structure decisions of firms. To
facilitate this analysis, we first complete the equilibrium analysis by studying the properties
of the dynamics outside of the steady state. To make the analysis of the transitional dynamics
tractable we will impose the additional assumption that consumers are risk neutral,
 () = , for all  ≥ 0 (19)
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As a consequence, the stochastic discount factor is constant and equal to  and, hence,
1
1 + ∗ = , for all 
in any equilibrium. On the basis of assumption (19), we show in this section that the
equilibrium dynamics converges monotonically to the steady state.
Under assumption (19), the equilibrium conditions outside the steady state can be re-
duced to a system of two equations. From the market-clearing condition in sub-period 
(Condition 4), we have
 = (1−  ())R 
0
  (20)
Letting  () denote the term on the right hand side of (20), we readily see that  () is
a continuously decreasing function of  on the interval [0 1], for all  ≥ 1. The first-order
condition for the optimal capital structure (Condition 2) can then be rewritten asµ
1−  (+1)+1
¶µ 
 (+1) + +1
¶  (+1)
1−  (+1) =   (21)
Holding +1 constant, an increase in +1 increases the left hand side of (21), so the change
in +1 must decrease
³
1− (+1)+1
´
. In other words, an increase in +1 must decrease +1.
This shows that, if we denote by  (+1) the solution of (21) with respect to   (+1)
is a continuously decreasing function of  on the interval [0 1], for all  ≥ 1. The profit-
maximization condition 1. of the capital good producers,
0() = 1 (22)
implies that the investment level  = () is a well defined and strictly increasing function
of ; hence (()) is a well defined and decreasing function of  on the interval [0 1]  for
all  ≥ 0.
Substituting these functions for    into the expressions specifying the law of motion
of the market value of the firms in the consumption good sector (in Condition 2)5 and the
capital market-clearing (Condition 6), we obtain the system of two diﬀerence equations below
in  and :
() = 
∙
+ (+1)¯ − (+1)
Z 1
+1
( − +1)
¸
(23)
+1 = ¯ + (()) (24)
This dynamic system can be solved for the values {( )}∞=1, subject to the initial condi-
tions determining6 1. This sequence defines an equilibrium trajectory if it belongs to an
equilibrium as defined in Definition 5.
5We also use (20) to simplify the expression in (23), as we did in the proof of Proposition 7.
6The initial conditions are given by 1 = ¯¯0 + (0) with 0 determined by

h
+ (1)¯ − (1) R 11( − 1)i0(0) = 1 as a function of 1.
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The first of the two equations, (23), only depends on . Hence the dynamics for  is
determined by that equation, and does not depend on . We show in the Appendix that the
dynamics for  is as described in the following figure:
where the red line is the graph of the term on the right hand side of (23), and the blue
line is the graph of the term on the left hand side, both regarded as functions of . The
two curves intersect at the unique steady-state value  = ∗. At that point the slope of
the red curve is flatter than the slope of the blue curve. Also, both curves are negatively
sloped. This implies that, starting at any initial point 1 6= ∗, the trajectory {} satisfying
the diﬀerence equation must diverge away from ∗. In fact, if 1  ∗  is monotonically
increasing until it reaches a value, strictly smaller than one, beyond which a solution to (23)
no longer exists.7 On the other hand, if 1  ∗ both curves diverge to infinity and the
dynamics is monotonically decreasing approaching zero. This is also unfeasible, since we see
from (21), (20), (22) that when  → 0, , ,  and hence also  tend to infinity, which violate
the boundedness property established in Proposition 1.
This shows that in any competitive equilibrium we must have  = ∗ for all . From this
it follows that prices and the investment level are constant along the equilibrium path, at
the levels  = (∗) = ∗,  = (∗) = ∗ and  =  (∗) = ∗, for all , while the dynamics
of the capital stock is determined by the law of motion
+1 = ¯ +  (∗) 
with 1 determined by the initial conditions. Then
++1 =
³
¯ + ¯2 + · · ·+ ¯
´
 (∗) + ¯+1
→  (
∗)
1− ¯ = 
∗ as  →∞
7If  → 1, the term on the right hand side converges to  and the one on the left hand side converges to
0. Thus for some finite value of  there is no value of +1 that satisfies the (23).
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So the capital stock converges to its steady-state value. We have thus established the fol-
lowing:
Proposition 9 Let {( )}∞=1 be a solution of (23), (24), satisfying 0 = ¯0. Then
{( )}∞=1 is an equilibrium trajectory only if, for all  ≥ 1,  = ∗, where ∗ is the
uniquely determined steady-state capital structure. Furthermore,  converges monotonically
to its steady-state value, ∗.
6 Welfare analysis
6.1 The ineﬃciency of equilibrium
If we compare the conditions for a Pareto eﬃcient steady state derived in Proposition 2
with the conditions for a steady-state equilibrium derived in Section 4.1, we can say that
steady-state equilibria are Pareto eﬃcient if ∗ = , which happens when the equilibrium
market value of capital is given by
∗ = 
1− ¯
From the equilibrium conditions, in particular Condition 2, it can be seen immediately that
the equality above can hold only if  = 0. In that case, there is no cost of issuing equity
and the firms in the consumption good sector will choose 100% equity finance. On the other
hand, when   0, as we have been assuming, the equilibrium market value of capital ∗
is strictly lower than 
1−¯ and ∗ and ∗ are strictly less than the corresponding values
at the first best steady state. Thus, in a steady state equilibrium, the financial frictions of
incomplete markets and the perceived costs of default and equity financing, imply that firms
invest a lower amount and the equilibrium stock of capital is lower than at the eﬃcient steady
state.8 Even with a representative consumer, competitive equilibria are Pareto ineﬃcient, as
we shall see next section.
6.2 Constrained ineﬃciency
It is not surprising that the equilibrium is Pareto-ineﬃcient in the presence of distortionary
taxation. A more surprising result is that, even in the presence of frictions, regulation of a
single variable, while allowing other variables to reach their equilibrium levels, can lead to
a welfare improvement. That is, competitive equilibria are also constrained ineﬃcient. We
8When the initial capital stock 0 =  the unique Pareto eﬃcient allocation of the economy is the
Pareto eﬃcient steady state. Since as we saw the equilibrium allocation is diﬀerent, it is clearly Pareto
ineﬃcient. For other values of 0 the diﬀerence between the Pareto eﬃcient steady state and the equilibrium
steady state does not immediately imply that the latter is Pareto-ineﬃcient. For that, we would have to find
a Pareto-preferred (non-steady-state) allocation consistent with the initial value of 0. In the next section we
provide examples of welfare improving changes in the allocation starting from the equilibrium steady state.
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consider two possible types of interventions. In the first, we control the level of aggregate
investment. In the second we control the breakeven level of debt. To make the analysis more
transparent, we still focus our attention here on the case where consumers are risk neutral,
that is (19) holds.
Controlling investment  Starting in a steady-state equilibrium, we consider an increase
in the investment level at some date . Thus, at date ,  is no longer determined by Condition
1 of Definition 5, but set equal to ∗+∆. The rest of the equilibrium variables are determined
by the agents’ optimizing decisions and market-clearing conditions. In particular, the output
of capital goods at all subsequent dates responds to the exogenous change in investment.
The law of motion of the capital stock is now
+1 = ¯∗ +  (∗ +∆) 
+ = ¯+−1 + (+−1), for all   1,
while the market-clearing condition in the liquidation market, the optimality condition for
the firms’ capital structure and the law of motion for  are still given by (20), (21) and
(23). Similarly, at each subsequent date +   , the level of  is determined by the profit-
maximization condition of the capital good producers, (22). Since equations (20), (21) and
(23) are unchanged, the analysis of the transition dynamics in Section 5 still applies and
implies that their solution is given by + = ∗ +−1 = ∗, + = ∗, for all   0. It also
follows that + = ∗ after date .
The dynamics for consumption is given by the following equations:
 = ∗ − (∗ + ) 
+1 = (¯∗ +  (∗ + ))− ∗
+ = (∗ + ¯−1 ( (∗ +∆)−  (∗)))− ∗, for all   1
Hence, the sign of the eﬀect on welfare of this intervention is equal to the sign ofÃ
−1 + 0(∗)
∞X
=0
¡¯¢!∆
The term in brackets in this expression is strictly positive because, as we showed in the
previous section, in a steady-state equilibrium we always have
 
1− ¯ 
1
0(∗) = 
∗
Hence, a temporary increase of investment above its equilibrium value increases welfare by
bringing the stock of capital closer to its first-best level.
Notice that if we allow for repeated interventions of the kind described, setting the level
of the investment  =  at all dates  +  for   0, it may be possible to attain the
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Pareto-eﬃcient steady state allocation after a transition of one period. It is in fact easy to
verify, by a similar argument to the one above, that the following intervention:
at date , set  such that  = ¯∗ +  ()
at all + ,   0 set + = 
provided that ∗ ≥ , induces the following equilibrium consumption sequence:
 = ∗ − 
+ =  −  =  for all   1
Controlling the breakeven point  Now consider an alternative intervention, consisting
of a change in the capital structure of the firms producing in the consumption good sector,
with all other variables determined as in equilibrium. In particular, we consider a permanent9
change ∆ starting at some fixed but arbitrary date  + 1. The induced changes in the
equilibrium variables  and  are obtained from the market-clearing condition in sub-period
, (20), and the law of motion of , (23). After substituting the new value of , the new
values of  and  are determined by
 (1−  (∗ +∆)) = +
Z ∗+∆
0
 = +
∙
∗(∗) +
Z ∗
0

¸
 (25)
and 10
+ = 
½
+ ++1¯ − ++1
Z 1
∗+∆
( − ∗ −∆)
¾
 (26)
for all   0. We see from (25) that the new equilibrium value for + is the same for all 
and from (26) we obtain a first-order diﬀerence equation in . The solution of this equation
diverges monotonically since the coeﬃcient on ++1 has absolute value¯¯¯¯
¯ − 
Z 1
∗+∆
( − ∗ −∆)
¯¯¯¯
 max
½
¯ 
Z 1
∗+∆
( − ∗ −∆)
¾
≤ max©¯  ¯ª = ¯  1
Hence, the only admissible solution is obtained by setting + equal to its steady-state value:
+ = ++1 = ∗ +∆ = 
1− ¯ +  R 1∗+∆( − ∗ −∆)  (27)
9We focus attention on a permanent, rather than a temporary, intervention to make the analysis simpler,
but it is fairly easy to verify that the same welfare result holds in the case of a temporary intervention.
10Note that expressions (25) and (26) give us the new equilibrium levels of  and  also for any discrete
change ∆, as long as we have  ≥ , that is as long as  +∆ is not too close to 0
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The remaining equilibrium variables are determined by the optimality condition for the
capital goods producers, (22), and the capital market clearing condition, (24), which are
both unchanged. Since, by the previous argument, +1 is equal to its new steady-state
equilibrium value, ∗+∆, we have + = ∗+∆ for all   0, where the sign of ∆ equals
the sign of ∆
The eﬀect on welfare is then determined, as in the case of the first intervention considered,
by the change in  and hence in , and consumers’ welfare increases if and only if   0.
From (27) it is then easy to verify that sign ∆ = sign ∆, since

∗
Z 1
∗
( − ∗) = −
Z 1
∗
  0
and so, in the limit,

 =



 =


µ
−
00

¶
 0
Hence, welfare is increased by a permanent increase in  above its steady-state equilibrium
value.
When  is increased above ∗, the equilibrium value of  increases, as we see from (27),
but the tax liability divided by , that is,  R 1 ( − ) , decreases, as we can also see
from (27). In fact, it is because the tax liability falls relative to  that the value of capital
increases. Firms do not choose a higher value of  in equilibrium because they are price
takers and hence do not internalize the fact that, if they all increase ,  decreases and 
increases. They choose  to maximize (12), without taking into account the eﬀect of  on 
and .
Also, both the default and tax costs ‘wash out’ in the welfare analysis, since they only
entail a redistribution of wealth between debt holders, equity holders, and taxpayers Given
the homogeneity of consumers, such a redistribution has no eﬀect on welfare. The only eﬀect
on welfare comes from the change in investment and capital. Any intervention that increases
 and  is welfare improving.
The intervention acts directly on the threshold below which the firm has to default on
its debt. To claim that an increase of this threshold corresponds to an increase in the debt-
equity ratio, the change in the market value of debt and equity should also be taken into
account, that is we should look at

 =
R 
0
(+ +)  + R 1 +(++)+ R 1
 +(+ − ) (1− ) 
(28)
The eﬀect of a marginal increment in , starting from ∗ on the value of the debt equity
ratio  , is not straightforward to determine in general. We will show in what follows that,
for a discrete, suﬃciently large increment in  we have an unambiguous increase in the debt
equity ratio  .
Consider a sequence of discrete changes ∆, such that  +∆ approaches 1. Along such
sequence  goes to zero and we also see from (26) that  approaches 
1−¯ and hence, by
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(24),  approaches . That is, in the limit, the equilibrium corresponding to such an
intervention converges to the steady-state, first-best allocation.11 Also, as  → 1, we have

 =
R 
0
(+ +)  + R 1 +(++)+ R 1
 + (1− ) ( − ) 
→ +  lim→1
R 1

1
+
0
=∞
Hence, we can indeed say that the debt equity ratio is increasing, at least in the limit, as a
result of such intervention.12
To gain some understanding for this result recall that, as noticed above, both the corpo-
rate income tax and the perceived cost of bankruptcy are transfers rather than deadweight
costs. The revenue of the corporate income tax is paid to consumers and the fire sale losses
of bankrupt firms provide capital gains for the solvent firms. When we look at the expression
for the value of firms at a competitive equilibrium (see equation (17)), we see that only the
tax payment appears as a “cost” that reduces the level of . This is because only the tax
payments are transferred outside of the corporate sector, thus reducing the firms’ equilibrium
value.
6.3 Liquidity provision
Fire sales are a necessary element of equilibrium, as we have shown. Equity is dominated by
debt finance unless bankruptcy is perceived to be costly and, in equilibrium, both debt and
equity finance must be used. One might think that speculators would have an incentive to
accumulate liquidity in order to buy assets at fire sale prices, but speculation does little to
restore the eﬃciency of equilibrium. As long as liquid assets yield a low return, speculators
will not hold them unless they can expect capital gains from buying assets in the fire sale.
The supply of liquidity will never be suﬃcient to eliminate fire sales. In fact, the presence of
liquid assets can make the competitive equilibrium less eﬃcient. As we have pointed out, the
“costs” of bankruptcy are a transfer rather than a true economic cost. For the same reason,
the capital gains from buying assets in fire sales are also a transfer. So holding low-yielding
liquid assets in order to buy up assets in a fire sale is always ineﬃcient. In fact, it can make
everyone worse oﬀ than in an economy without liquid assets.13
To represent the possibility of speculative arbitrage to provide liquidity in the market, we
extend the analysis by introducing an additional, “safe” technology to produce the consump-
tion good using the capital good, also subject to constant returns to scale. We assume that
11Note that the equilibrium condition (25) has an admissible solution for all  +∆  1, but not in the
limit for  +∆ = 1
12In contrast, we see from (11), that when firms act as price takers their optimal decision when  → 0 is
 ∼ 0
13Investing in a safe technology that is less productive than the risky technology is always ineﬃcient. This
does not mean, however, that introducing a safe technology cannot increase equilibrium welfare. Since the
steady-state equilibrium is ineﬃcient to begin with, introducing an ineﬃcient techology can make everyone
better oﬀ. The crucial question is how diﬀerent the productivities of the two technologies are. We show in
this section that if the productivity diﬀerence is suﬃciently small, a steady-state equilibrium with the safe
technology will be preferred to a steady-state equilibrium without it.
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one unit of capital applied to this technology produces  units of the good and that after
depreciation the amount of capital remaining is ¯. The two technologies have then the same
average depreciation rate but the depreciation rate of the safe technology is deterministic.
We assume that   ; otherwise, the safe technology would dominate the risky technology.
Each firm in the consumption good sector now faces a technology choice, in addition to
the choice of its capital structure. Otherwise, the definition of a competitive equilibrium is
unchanged.
To analyze the firms’ technology choice, consider a firm which has one unit of capital at
date . If the capital is entirely invested in the safe technology, the optimal capital structure
is full debt financing, since there is no default risk in this case. At date  + 1 the firm
produces  units of goods which it retains and uses to buy +1 units of capital. Then, at
the end of date +1, the firm has +1 + ¯ units of capital which is valued at +1
³

+1 + ¯
´
.
In equilibrium, it is optimal for the firm to invest all its capital in the safe technology if and
only if
 = 1
1 + +1
µ 
+1 + ¯
¶
 (29)
In addition, the zero profit condition requires that the nominal value of debt issued by the
firm fully investing in the safe technology is equal to +1 =  + +1¯
We establish first some properties of the equilibrium technology choice.
Proposition 10 At a competitive equilibrium, if +1  +1 it is never optimal for a con-
sumption good producer to use both technologies at the same time.
This proposition is the result of the non-convexity of the firm’s objective function as-
sociated with costly bankruptcy. If the firm has a positive amount of debt and a positive
probability of default, the firm can increase its value by shifting all its production to the
risky technology, keeping the default probability and the default cost unchanged and enjoy-
ing the higher returns of the technology, or to the safe technology which allows to avoid all
the default risk and cost.
We show next that, as in the previous specification, in equilibrium we always have +1 
+1 Suppose not, that is we have +1 = +1 In that case there is no default cost, hence
firms by investing in the risky technology and fully financing with debt attain a higher value,
since    and there is no cost attached to debt financing. But if all firms only invest
in the risky technology we have shown in the previous section there can be no equilibrium
where +1 = +1
Having shown that +1  +1 the market clearing condition in the liquidation market
implies that at least a positive fraction of firms invest in the risky technology. Hence at
a competitive equilibrium two possible cases arise. The first one is a situation where all
firms invest in the risky technology. The equilibrium is then the same as in the previous
section. More precisely, a competitive equilibrium
©¡∗  ∗  ∗+1 ∗  ∗+1 ∗  ∗ ¢ª∞=0 according
to Definition 5 is also an equilibrium when consumption good producers also face a choice
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between a risky and a safe technology provided the equilibrium values satisfy the following
condition, for all 
∗ ≥ 11 + ∗ 
∗+1
µ 
∗+1 + ¯
¶
 (30)
that is, no producer can gain at these prices by switching form the risky to the safe technology.
The second case arises when (30) is violated, in which case the competitive equilibrium is
diﬀerent and entails a positive fraction (1−∗∗ ) ∈ (0 1) of firms using the safe technology. In
this case, the equilibrium conditions need to be partly modified, in particular the liquidation
market clearing condition, which becomes
∗∗
Z ∗∗
0
 = ∗∗  (1−  (∗∗ )) + (1− ∗∗ ) (31)
to reflect the fact that the buyers of capital goods now include the solvent firms investing in
the risky technology and all the firms investing in the safe technology, as well as the good
market clearing condition,
∗∗ ∗∗ + (1− ∗∗ ) ∗∗ = ∗∗ + ∗∗  (32)
to reflect the diﬀering productivities of the two technologies. In addition, condition (29),
requiring that firms must be indiﬀerent between the safe and risky technologies, must also
hold.
We investigate in what follows the welfare properties of these equilibria. We show in
particular that the availability of an alternative, safe technology, which allows firms to avoid
the default risk, generates an additional source of ineﬃciency.
Proposition 11 There exists a unique value of , denoted by ¯  0, such that if  ≤ ¯ we
have ∗∗ = 1 in any steady-state equilibrium (∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗). By contrast,
for some   0 and any  ∈ ¡¯ ¯ + ¢, ∗∗  1 and the consumption level ∗∗ is lower than
in the equilibrium with ∗∗ = 1.
In what follows we focus again our attention on the case where (19) holds, that is con-
sumers are risk neutral. Hence, the critical value of , denoted by ¯, is given by
¯ = 
∗ ¡1− ¯¢
 
where ∗ is the price of liquidated capital at a steady-state equilibrium of the economy
with no safe technology. At this steady-state equilibrium price, (30) holds with equality
when  = ¯, hence firms are indiﬀerent between using the safe and risky technologies. At
¯ +   ¯, (30) no longer holds, the steady-state equilibrium involves a positive fraction
of firms 1− ∗∗  0 adopting the safe technology and a higher steady-state equilibrium value
of ,
∗∗ = (¯ + )
1− ¯  (33)
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We show in the proof of the proposition in the Appendix that equilibrium welfare is lower
at a new steady-state equilibrium than at the original one. Since the original allocation,
with all firms investing in the risky technology, clearly remains feasible, this shows that the
equilibrium indeed exhibits an ineﬃcient technology choice, with excessive investment in the
safe technology, as claimed.
The intuition for the result is as follows. At the competitive equilibrium with = ¯+,
a positive fraction of firms adopt the safe technology, hence the liquidity available is higher
and  lower. However, as we show in the proof, the market value of the firm, , decreases,
which implies that the steady-state investment and capital stock both decrease. This drop
in  reflects the fact that an ineﬃcient technology is used, thus reducing the amount of
available resources (a real cost in this case).
It is interesting to note that as  is increased further and, in particular, as  approaches
, the safe technology is in the limit as productive as the risky one and consumption and the
value of the firm both approach their first best steady state levels. Thus, the ineﬃciency
vanishes in the limit. This shows that the relationship between the equilibrium value of 
and  is non monotonic: if we keep increasing , eventually  must increase as well. The
availability of a safe technology that can provide liquidity reduces the cost for firms of issuing
debt and hence reduces the cost borne by firms to issue equity. As  keeps increasing, this
eﬀect ends up prevailing over the cost associated with the use of an ineﬃcient technology.
7 Conclusion
We have analyzed the firms’ capital structure choice in a dynamic general equilibrium econ-
omy with incomplete markets. Firms face a standard trade-oﬀ between the exemption of
interest payments on debt from the corporate income tax and the risk of costly default. The
cost of default arises from the fact that if a firm defaults on its debt, it may be forced to
liquidate its assets in a fire sale. Fire sales are endogenous and arise from the illiquidity of
the capital market where the firm’s assets are sold. When the corporate income tax rate is
zero, there are no fire sales, the firm’s capital structure is indeterminate, and the equilibrium
is eﬃcient. When the tax rate is positive, we show that fire sales are an essential part of the
equilibrium, the optimal capital structure is uniquely determined in equilibrium and firms’
investment is below the first-best level. Moreover, the amount of debt chosen by the firm is
constrained ineﬃcient: increasing the ratio of debt to equity (more precisely, the breakeven
level) will increase the level of investment and the welfare of the representative consumer.
We also show that the introduction of a safe asset, which allows firms to make arbitrage
profits in the capital markets, may actually reduce welfare. Although the arbitrage activity
increases the liquidity of the market and raises the price of liquidated assets, it also reduces
the return on capital and, hence, may lower the incentive to invest.
These findings highlight the subtle asymmetry between the corporate income tax and the
risk of fire sales in default. Whereas the revenues from the corporate income tax are paid as
lump sum transfers to consumers and leave the corporate sector, the capital gains from fire
sales remain within the corporate sector and oﬀset the capital losses. The introduction of a
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safe asset operates through a diﬀerent mechanism, by diverting the capital gains from fire
sales to the firms choosing the safe, but less productive asset.
It is through such pecuniary externalities, concerning the price of firms’ liquidated assets,
that the choice of capital structure aﬀects welfare when markets are incomplete. These
pecuniary externalities are the key to understanding the impact of capital structure on
welfare in general equilibrium.
Although the model we have studied deals with firms that produce goods, the results
are suggestive for the current debate about the funding and capital structure of financial
institutions in the wake of the financial crisis. A similar exercise for financial institutions
would seem to be an important topic for future research.
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Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 From the strict concavity of  and the gradient inequality, it
follows that, for any   ˆ,
 () ≤ 
³
ˆ
´
+ 0
³
ˆ
´

³
 − ˆ
´
=
¡
1− ¯¢ ˆ + 0 ³ˆ´³ − ˆ´
 ¡1− ¯¢ ˆ
Hence
 () + ¯  ¡1− ¯¢ ˆ + ¯  ˆ
For any   ˆ,
 () ≤ 
³
ˆ
´
+ 0
³
ˆ
´

³
 − ˆ
´
 ¡1− ¯¢ ˆ + ¡1− ¯¢ ³ − ˆ´
=
¡
1− ¯¢ 
where the second inequality follows from the assumptions made on  (·), implying the exis-
tence of a unique solution for ˆ. Thus,
  ˆ =⇒ +1  
and
  ˆ =⇒ +1  ˆ
Proof of Proposition 2 At an optimal steady state the multipliers {(∗  ∗ )}∞=0 satisfy
∗ = 0 (∗) = ∗0
and hence
∗ = 
∗

0 (∗) =
∗0
∗0∗0 = 
∗0
for every . The first-order conditions for the steady-state optimum can then be written as
0 (∗) = ∗0 (34)
∗0+ ∗0¯ = ∗0 (35)
∗00 (∗) = ∗0 (36)
Conditions (35) and (36) can be rewritten as

1− ¯ =
∗0
∗0 =
1
0 (∗) (37)
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The feasibility conditions become
∗ + ∗ = ∗
and
∗ = ¯∗ +  (∗) 
Thus,
∗ =  (
∗)
1− ¯ 
where ∗ is determined by (37).
Proof of Proposition 4 The firm’s choice problem (12) can be rewritten as follows:
 = max+1
1
1 + 
½Z +1
0
(+ +1+1)  (+1) +1 +Z 1
+1
µ
+1
µ 
+1 + +1
¶
− +1 (+1 − +1)
¶
 (+1) +1
¾

The derivative of the expression on the right hand side with respect to +1 is easily calculated
to be
1
1 + 
½
(+ +1+1)  (+1)− +1
µ 
+1 + +1
¶
 (+1) +
(+1 − +1)  (+1) + +1 (1−  (+1))}
=
1
1 + 
½µ
1− +1+1
¶
 (+1) +
µ
1− +1+1
¶
+1+1 (+1) + +1 (1−  (+1))
¾

The first-order condition for an interior solution of the firm’s problem requires this expression
to equal zero, a condition which can be written asµ+1
+1 − 1
¶
(+ +1+1)  (+1) = +1 (1−  (+1)) 
or µ
1− +1+1
¶
(+ +1+1)  (+1)
1−  (+1) =  
Since all terms on the left hand side are positive, the solution to this equation, if it exists, is
unique if all these terms are increasing in +1. Obviously, + +1+1 is increasing in +1,
and so is (+1)
1− (+1) under the assumption of an increasing hazard rate.
From the above expression of the derivative we also see that a corner solution with +1 =
0 obtains when
³
1− +1+1
´
 (0)   . In contrast, it is easy to verify that a corner solution
with +1 = 1 never exists. By the continuity of the objective function in +1, a solution
always exists, so it follows that an interior solution exists when
³
1− +1+1
´
 (0)   .
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Market clearing in the securities market The markets for debt and equity clear at
any  if the amount of wealth the households want to carry forward into the next period is
equal to the value of debt and equity issued by firms in that period. The latter is equal to the
market value of depreciated capital, ¯, plus the value of newly produced capital goods,
 ()  To find the consumer’s savings, we need first to find the value of the consumer’s
wealth in sub-period  of date . This is equal to the sum of the profits from the capital
good sector, the proceeds from the liquidation of firms which defaulted in this period, and
the value of the firms that did not default in the period minus the corporation tax and the
lump sum transfer from the government. The corporation tax and the transfer cancel in
equilibrium and can be ignored. Hence, the consumer’s wealth, , is given by
 =  ()−  +
Z 
0
 ()  + 
Z 
0
 ()  + ¯ +
Z 1

 () 
− 
Z 
0
 () 
=  ()−  + + ¯
Therefore, the securities market clears at date  if
 −  =  ()−  + + ¯
=  ¡¯ +  ()¢
or
 +  = 
So market clearing in the goods market implies market clearing in the securities markets.
Proof of Proposition 7 Equation (16) comes directly from Condition 4 of the definition
of competitive equilibrium, applied to a steady state. Equation (18) is simply the first-order
condition from Condition 2 of the definition of competitive equilibrium.
The law of motion of the value of the firm can be written as
∗ = 
½Z ∗
0
(+ ∗) +
Z 1
∗
µ∗
∗ (+ 
∗)− ∗( − ∗)
¶

¾
= 
½Z ∗
0
(+ ∗ − (∗ − ∗)) +
Z 1

µ
+
µ∗
∗ − 1
¶
+ ∗ − ∗( − ∗)
¶

¾
= 
½Z ∗
0
µ
+ ∗ −
µ∗
∗ − 1
¶
∗
¶
 +
Z 1
∗
µ
+ ∗ +
µ∗
∗ − 1
¶
− ∗( − ∗)
¶

¾
= 
½
+ ∗¯ −
Z 1

∗( − ∗)
¾
where in the last step we used (16) to simplify the expression. Solving the last equation we
obtained for , we get:
∗
µ
1− ¯ + 
Z 1
∗
( − ∗) 
¶
= 
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or
∗ = 
1− ¯ +  R 1∗ ( − ∗)  
which is equation (17).
Now the value of ∗ =  (∗) given by equation (17) is an increasing function of ∗ and
the value of ∗ =  (∗) given by (16) is a decreasing function of ∗. Writing the first-order
condition (18) as µ
1−  (
∗)
 (∗)
¶µ 
 (∗) + 
∗
¶  (∗)
1−  (∗) =   (38)
it is clear from inspection that the terms on the left hand side are increasing in ∗, so there
exists at most one steady state.
To see that there exists a solution to (38), note that as ∗ → 0,  (∗) → ∞ and
 (∗) → 
1−¯+ ¯ , so for some finite value ∗  0,  (∗) =  (∗) and the left hand side
of (38) equals zero. Next, consider what happens as ∗ → 1 and note that  (∗) → 0 and
 (∗)→ 
1−¯  0, so the left hand side of (38) is positive. Thus, by continuity, there exists
a value of 0  ∗  1 satisfying (38).
Proof of Proposition 8 Consider first the eﬀect of a change in  . From equation (16) it
is clear that ∗ =  (∗) is independent of  whereas equation (17) shows that ∗ =  (∗ )
is decreasing in  . Then the first-order condition (38) can be rewritten asµ
1−  (
∗)
 (∗ )
¶µ 
 (∗) + 
∗
¶  (∗)
1−  (∗) =  
An increase in  increases the right hand side and, by decreasing  (∗ ), it decreases the
left hand side. Thus, to satisfy the first-order condition, the left hand side must be increased
and that requires an increase in ∗. Thus, an increase in  increases ∗ and, hence, reduces
∗ =  (∗). Since  (∗ ) is increasing in ∗ and decreasing in  , the net eﬀect on ∗ (and
hence the eﬀect on ∗ and ∗) is uncertain. What we can say, from equation (17), is that ∗
(and hence ∗ and ∗) will increase if the tax revenue  R 1∗ ( − ∗)  declines as a result of
the increase in  .
Now consider the impact of an increase in . Again, ∗ =  (∗) is independent of ,
whereas ∗ =  (∗ ) is increasing in  according to (17). Rewriting the first-order condition
(18) as follows µ
1−  (
∗)
 (∗ )
¶µ 
 (∗) + 
∗
¶  (∗)
1−  (∗) =  
it is clear that an increase in  will increase  (∗ ) and hence increase the left hand side.
To satisfy the first-order condition, the left hand side must be decreased, which requires a
decrease in ∗. From (16), ∗ must increase as a result of the decrease in ∗. The decrease
in ∗ in turn will lead to a decrease in  but the overall eﬀect on , since in this case the
term on the left hand side of (18) must stay constant for (18) to hold, is that  increases
(actually more than ). Hence ∗ and ∗ also increase.
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Proof of Proposition 9 At the unique steady-state value,  = ∗, the derivative of the
term on the left hand side of (23), 0 (∗), is negative and strictly smaller than the derivative
of the term on the right hand side. Denoting the term on the right hand side by  (+1),
where  () is defined by
 () = 
∙
+ ()¯ − ()
Z 1

( − )
¸

we have
0 (∗) = 0 (∗) ¯ − 0 (∗)
Z 1

( − ) +  (∗) (1−  (∗))
 0 (∗) 
since the second and third terms on the right hand side are positive. Then the fact that
0 (∗) is negative and 0    1 implies that 0 (∗)  0 (∗) as claimed. Since the steady
state is unique, this proves that
 () ≷  () as  ≶ ∗
for all 0    1.
We show next that 0 ()  0, for all 0    1. This is equivalent to
− 
0
 
 (1−  ())
¯ −  R 1 ( − )  (39)
Diﬀerentiating (21) we get
0
 =


⎛
⎝ ³

 + 
´

1−
⎞
⎠  +
0
 
Also, from (20) we get
0 = −
R 
0
 −(1−  )¡R 
0
¢2 
Since −0  0, a suﬃcient condition for (39) to hold is that
− 
⎛
⎝ ³

 + 
´

1−
⎞
⎠  = −


h³

2 0 − 1
´ ¡ 
1−
¢− ³ + ´  ¡ 1− ¢i³

 + 
´2 ¡ 
1−
¢2   (1−  )¯ −  R 1 ( − ) 
Recall that the hazard rate (1− ) is assumed to be increasing. Hence the above inequality
holds if


³
1− 2 0
´
³

 + 
´2 ¡ 
1−
¢  (1−  )¯ −  R 1 ( − ) 
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Substituting the expression for 0 derived above, this inequality can be rewritten as follows


1 + 2
  0 +(1− )
(
 
0 )
2³

 + 
´2  ¯ −  R 1 ( − ) 
or, using (20) to substitute for 


1
 +
 
0 +(1− )
(1− )2³ 
0 
1− + 
´2  1¯ −  R 1 ( − ) 
Note that the term on the left hand side can be rewritten as


"
(1−  )2¡R 
0
 + (1−  )¢2 + 1R 0  + (1−  )
#
 1R 
0
 + (1−  ) 
where the inequality sign follows from the fact that   1. Hence (39) holds if
¯ − 
Z 1

( − ) 
Z 
0
 + (1−  )
or
¯ −
Z 
0
 − 
Z 1

 =
Z 1

 (1− )  (1−  )(1− )
always satisfied. This completes the proof that 0 ()  0, for all 0    1
Denoting, as usual, the solution of (20) by  (), we note that  () → ∞ as  → 0
and  () → 0 as  → 1. Since the first-order condition (21) implies that +1  +1, we
have  () → ∞ as  → 0. And since  () → ∞ as  → 1, we must have  () → 0
as  → 1. Then  () → ∞ (resp. 0) as  → 0 (resp. 1), whereas  () behaves like
 £+ (1− ) ¯ ()¤ as  → 0, that is,  ()→∞ as  → 0, and  ()→  as  → 1.
Any sequence {} satisfying the diﬀerence equation (21) that does not begin at ∗ will
diverge either to 0 or 1. If  → 1, then within a finite number of steps  ()     ()
for any , so there does not exist a continuation value +1 that satisfies  () =  (+1).
If  → 0, on the other hand, then  () → ∞, which implies that  → ∞ and  → ∞,
violating the boundedness property established in Proposition 1. Thus, no divergent sequence
corresponds to an equilibrium and the only possible equilibrium sequence is  = ∗ for all .
Proof of Proposition 10 To see this, suppose to the contrary that at some date  a firm
with one unit of capital at its disposal devotes a fraction  of it to the risky technology and
the remaining fraction 1−  to the safe technology. As usual, we define the break even point
+1 for a debt with nominal value +1 as:
+ (1− ) + +1 ¡+1 + (1− ) ¯¢ = +1
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Then the expected value of the firm at date + 1 is given byZ +1
0
¡+ (1− ) + +1 ¡+1 + (1− ) ¯¢¢ +Z 1
+1
∙+1
+1
¡+ (1− ) + +1 ¡+1 + (1− ) ¯¢¢− +1 (+1 − +1)¸ 
since the tax base is
+1
+1
£+ (1− ) + +1 ¡+1 + (1− ) ¯¢− +1¤ =
+1
+1
£+ (1− ) + +1 ¡+1 + (1− ) ¯¢¤−+1+1 £+ (1− ) + +1 ¡+1 + (1− ) ¯¢¤ =
+1 (+1 − +1) 
We show below that the firm can achieve a higher value by splitting into two separate
entities, of size respectively  and 1−  the first one investing fully in the risky technology
and the second one investing fully in the safe one. The nominal value of the debt in the
second entity is set at (1− ) + +1 (1− ) ¯ = +1 while the one in the first entity is+ +1+1 = +1, that is the break even point is kept at +1 The sum of the value of
these two entities is then

∙Z +1
0
(+ +1+1)  +
Z 1
+1
µ+1
+1 (+ +1+1)− +1 (+1 − +1)
¶

¸
+
(1− )
∙+1
+1 ( + +1¯)
¸
which is clearly strictly greater than the value of the combined firm above, as long as +1 
+1. Moreover, the firm can also achieve a higher value by investing all the capital at its
disposal in the risky technology, if the first term in square brackets is larger than the second
one, and otherwise in the safe technology.
Proof of Proposition 11 When  = ¯ the steady state equilibrium is the same as in
the previous sections, characterized in Proposition 7. Hence the equation determining the
value of the firm is still given by (as in condition 2):
∗ = 
½Z ∗
0
(+ ∗)  +
Z 1
∗
µ∗
∗ (+ 
∗)− ∗ ( − ∗)
¶

¾
(40)
The change in the equilibrium value of  when  is increased to ¯ +  is obtained by
diﬀerentiating this equation with respect to  and evaluating the derivative at  = ¯ :

 = 
½µZ ∗
0

¶ 
 +
µ
1
∗
Z 1
∗
(+ ∗) 
¶ 

−
µ ∗
∗2
Z 1
∗∗

¶ 
 −
µ

Z 1
∗
( − ) 
¶ 

¾

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Rearranging, we getµ
1− ∗
Z 1
∗∗
(+ ∗)  + 
Z 1
∗
( − ) 
¶ 
 =

µZ ∗
0
 − 
∗
∗2
Z 1
∗

¶ 
 
Now, using the market-clearing condition (16), we see that

∗
Z 1
∗
(+ ∗)  = ∗
µ
 (1−  (∗)) +
Z 1
∗
∗
¶
=

∗
µ
∗
Z ∗
0
 + ∗
Z 1
∗

¶
= ¯  1
So,
1− ∗
Z 1
∗
(+ ∗)  + 
Z 1
∗
( − )  = 1− ¯ + 
Z 1
∗
( − ) 
 1− ¯  0
Similarly, again using (16),Z ∗
0
 − 
∗
∗2
Z 1
∗
 =
Z 
0
 − 
∗
∗
 (1−  (∗))
∗

Z ∗
0
 −
Z ∗
0
 = 0
From these two inequalities, it follows that  and

 have opposite signs. Since

  0
follows from (33) in the text, we have proved that   0.
The change in the steady-state equilibrium consumption level is then obtained by diﬀer-
entiating (32) with respect to  and evaluating the derivative at  = ¯:
∗∗ = ∗∗ − ∗∗ + (−)∗∗∗ (41)
since ∗ = 1. The profit maximization condition ∗0 (∗) = 1 implies, as already shown in the
previous section, that a reduction in ∗∗ reduces ∗∗, and the law of motion ∗∗ =  (∗∗)+¯∗∗
implies that a reduction in ∗∗ reduces ∗∗:
∗∗ = 
0 (∗)
1− ¯ 
∗∗
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Also, ∗∗ ≤ 0 since ∗ = 1 at the equilibrium associated with  = ¯. Then inspection of
(41) yields
∗∗  ∗∗ − ∗∗
=
µ0 (∗)
1− ¯ − 1
¶
∗∗
=
Ã

∗ ¡1− ¯¢ − 1
!
∗∗
so a suﬃcient condition for ∗∗  0 is ∗ ¡1− ¯¢  . But it is clear from (40) that
∗ ≤ 
n
1 + ¯ + ¡¯¢2 + · · · ¡¯¢ + · · ·o
=

1− ¯ 

1− ¯ 
This completes the proof of the proposition.
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